Patent settlements in the pharmaceutical industry between originator and generic firms have been scrutinized critically by competition authorities for delaying the market entry of generics and being therefore potentially anticompetitive. In this paper we present a model that analyzes the tradeoff between limiting the delaying of generic entry through patent settlements and giving generic firms more incentives for challenging weak patents of the originator firms. We can show that under general assumptions allowing patent settlements with a later market entry of generics than the expected market entry under patent litigation would increase consumer welfare. We introduce a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would maximize consumer welfare and show that the size of this policy parameter depends on the size of the challenging costs, the intensity of competition, and the duration between the market entries of the first and second generic.
Introduction
It is a much discussed phenomenon that patent offices grant many patents that are later found invalid (Lemley/Shapiro 2005 , Lemley 2001 , Allison/Lemley 1998 . Thus, patents, in reality, do not grant an ironclad "right to exclude" but a weaker "right to try to exclude" facing potentially re-examination proceedings in courts and -invalidation (Shapiro 2003, p. 395) .
This is why patents can be seen as "probabilistic" intellectual property (Lemley/Shapiro 2005.) . If patents can be seen as "probabilistic" which means that they entail a chance to be invalid, society has an interest to let them be challenged and eventually be removed by courts (see Ayres/Klemperer 1999 , Shapiro 2003 or Lemley/Shapiro 2005) . From an economic perspective there exists a general tradeoff between having the benefits of the challenging of intellectual property rights and accepting the costs for incentivizing these patent challenges.
This is because on one hand earlier market entry through patent challenges could increase consumer welfare but on the other hand firms need to have incentives to challenge which entails costs for society. Challenging a patent is costly for firms and it might well be that only a narrow range of patents are worth challenging. Since consumers ultimately benefit from patent challenges with the chance of removing invalid patents, it makes sense that consumers bear a share of the challenge costs. This means to let consumers take a share of challenging costs to maintain firm's incentive to challenge (Frank/Kerber 2015) .
Following this rational, we model in our paper the implementation of a policy parameter granting the right to parties in a framework of a patent settlement to share profits for a period of time (i.e. to agree on later generic market entry) to give optimal incentives to challenge probabilistic patents. Hence the used framework of a patent settlement can be seen as an application for the more general tradeoff problem described before which we model by implementation of our policy parameter. Since challenging incentives could also be too high and market entry after a patent challenge too late, our policy parameter can also become negative.
We show that there exists an optimal policy parameter which, if implemented, yields higher consumer welfare compared to the litigation solution under the constellation that the policy parameter is non-negative, which is given in case challenging costs are sufficiently high.
Under constellations where the policy parameter becomes negative, all established settlements are welfare decreasing. Also we derive that the optimal policy parameter should increase in 3 case challenge costs for patents increase. Using a specific example we can show that in case the second generic in our model has a later decision on market entry or in case the market is more competitive, the policy parameter should also increase.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the basic patent settlement problem and shows the relevance of challenging incentives in this context in the literature and current discussion. Section 3 explains the model framework. In Section 4 we derive the model equilibrium and the optimal policy parameter as well as specific conditions for a feasible solution. Also we deliver an intuition of the tradeoff leading to the inner solution for the optimal parameter. In Section 5 we are deriving the consumer welfare difference between a situation with the policy parameter and the prohibition of collusive patent settlement agreements and explain the underlying effects. Section 6 provides comparative statics where we analyze the behavior of the optimal policy parameter in case of a change in our model parameters. Section 7 summarizes our results and concludes their relevance for policy recommendation.
Patent Settlements and Incentives for Patent Challenges
Patent Settlements in the pharmaceutical sector have caused vast discussions in the area of antitrust-/ competition law and intellectual property in the US and the EU. Agreements between originator and generic firms have been accused of violating competition rules through the sharing of supracompetitive profits in the context of patent disputes where generics challenge the validity of so-called weak patents (patents with a high probability that they are found invalid in courts) (Shapiro 2003 , Lemley/Shapiro 2005 . The core allegation is that originators induce generics to drop patent challenges, so stopping them from attacking these weak patents, by agreeing on a specific generic market entry date before regular patent expiry and/or granting a value transfer. Society is deprived of the chance that the patent is invalidated in a court proceeding and of the possibility of subsequent earlier market access by generics. Antitrust-and competition authorities in the US and the EU as well as courts, not be worse off in a settlement agreement (this is referred to as "Shapiro criterion", see Shapiro 2003) . Thus the right to reap monopoly profits through a patent should be discounted according to the patent strength (the chance that the patent is held valid in court) which e.g.
could translate into a 50% reduction of patent duration in case the patent is valid with 50%
probability. So on one hand there is the argument that generic market entry in a patent settlement should not be later than expected under litigation and on the other, that it is beneficial for society if invalid patents are removed, i.e. costly patent challenges are incentivized.
The positive effect of patent challenges has been discussed in various forms (e.g. Dickey et al. 2010 , p. 399, Gratz 2012 . However, only Gratz 2012 (implicitly) models the tradeoff between incentivizing patent challenges and allowing higher firm profits and later market entry in patent settlements. In her model she finds that a specifically tailored rule-of-reason assessment of patent settlements, where reverse payments from the originator to the generic are allowed, leads courts to a certain extent to erroneously uphold anticompetitive patent settlements. This at first is bad for consumers but results in higher settlement profits for the parties and higher challenging incentives overcompensating the negative effect. Gratz 2012 crucial assumption is that under a rule of reason regime courts make errors in assessing whether settlement agreements violate competition rules. An important implication from her model is, that firm's profits from entering into a settlement agreement and also their incentive to challenge patents increase in case the error interval increases as well. This is because the error has an asymmetrical effect for firm profits: Courts wrongly accept anticompetitive patent settlements (which increase expected profits of firms) and wrongly prohibit legal settlements (which theoretically decreases expected profits of firms), but in the latter case parties could still choose litigation (which prevents the loss in expected profits for the settlement parties from the wrong court decision). As a result Gratz 2012 derives an optimal error to maximize consumer welfare (ibid., pp. 13).
Thus reverse payments can be beneficial for consumers when incentives to challenge weak patents increase which have previously been inefficiently low. In the EU the guidelines for the assessment of patent settlements state that the removal of intellectual property which is invalid and thereby constitutes a blocking of innovations is beneficial for society which points 5 at the public interest of incentivizing patent challenges and properly assess patent settlements In our model, the implemented policy parameter is constructed to allow parties of a patent settlement additional periods of collusion to broaden the range of patent challenges. Thus deviations from the benchmark litigation solution, i.e. the expected entry under litigation, can be positive for consumer welfare. This is true for generic entry before and after expected entry under litigation. It is important to note that we discuss patent challenges that potentially lead to an invalidation of a patent and not to a mere non-infringement decision by courts. This is crucial since we want to examine patent challenges which have an effect on one other generic as well. In addition, we discuss the sequential entry of two generics. There is evidence that multiple generic patent challenges happen, but are limited (Grabowski/Kyle 2007, pp. 500) . From a theoretical perspective it is also difficult for an originator to settle with many 1 The challenging of weak patents can also be described as a free rider problem since the first generic challenger has costs to invalidate the patent and all other generics profit from that. This is referred to as a public good problem with the risk to cause under provision of patent challenges (See Farrell/Merges (2004, pp. 952 ), Hemphill (2006, pp. 150) . This different effect is discussed in the literature and also can be seen as motivation to introduce the 180 day rule in the Hatch Waxman framework. It should be noted that establishing a reverse payment patent settlement is also difficult in case there exist multiple challengers, since the patent holder needed to settle with each of them (570 U. S. ____ (2013) FTC v. Actavis, Roberts, C.J. dissenting p.16). In case for subsequent challengers there are smaller, insufficient incentives to challenge patents this problem could be solved endogenously (Fischmann 2014, pp. 423 ). In our analysis we do not focus on the multiple challenger problem entailing the mentioned public good character of patent challenges as we do not model endogenous interaction between different generics. 2 E.g. a patent challenger could get a refund on the litigation costs independent of the outcome of litigation in case certain requirements for the patent challenge are met (Fischmann 2014, pp. 436 
Model Framework
Our model follows the general framework introduced by Gratz (2012 
Fig 1: Illustration of market structure depending on firms' market entry dates
In a patent settlement parties are able to share profits (e.g. by paying a reverse-payment from the originator to the generic). However, settlements are only possible in case they do not violate the benchmark litigation solution since they otherwise would result in later entry than expected under litigation and violate antitrust rules. This implies that they are not allowed to specify entry dates 
Therefore, the generated surplus compared to litigation is
for
which allows us to determine the critical levels of patent strength for which generic companies are indifferent between challenging a patent or not. Respecting that the relevant expected litigation profits for 1 G and 2 G are given by
Given Equations (4) and (5) we can conclude that 1 G challenges patents for 
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Maximizing Equation (6) with respect to t  yields
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The interpretation of (7) is straightforward: If the competition authority is more generous with patent settlements, the joint settlement profits increase and hence generic companies challenge more patents. This is reflected by the incentive effects. find that a marginal increase in t  creates a tradeoff between incentivizing more patent challenges and creating more collusion. The next step is to find the optimal policy, which is denoted by opt t  .
Since we have that
we find that opt t  can be explicitly described by
As we know that
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Note that we can show that 0 where the incentives to challenge patents are (too) small.
Welfare Analysis
In order to show that the implementation of opt t  is beneficial for consumers, we have to compare our results to the benchmark case where settlements are not allowed and firms go for litigation. Using Equation (6) 
Comparative Statics

The Effects of an Increase in Challenging Costs
In this chapter we analyze the comparative statics of the optimal policy parameter opt t  .
As we already know that challenge costs have a crucial impact on the optimal policy, we examine at first how opt t  changes with g f . The challenge costs include firm investments for entering the market, i.e. technology-and infrastructure investments to overcome market entry barriers, as well as settlement costs, i.e. time and effort to prepare and arrange a settlement.
The corresponding result is given in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: The optimal policy parameter opt t  is strictly increasing in g f .
Proof: See Appendix A.
In order to interpret the result of Proposition 2, we recall that opt t  was determined by equation (7).
Analyzing (7), we see by using (8) and (9) However, a marginal increase in g f makes it more costly to challenge patents and hence firms would ceteris paribus only challenge relatively weaker patents, i.e. patents with a smaller γ . 
Introducing a specific Competition Model for Parameter Analysis
The remaining exogenous parameters of our model can be divided into two different groups:
While λ is an independent exogenous variable, we know that and profits under duopoly and triopoly). In order to cope with these issues, we introduce a specific competition model where i) firms compete in prices and ii) products are heterogeneous with a variable degree of substitutability. We expect assumptions i) and ii) to adequately reflect the characteristics of real world markets for pharmaceutical products. The details are summarized in Example 1.
Example 1:
We consider a special case of the model presented in Häckner (2000) for the case of n firms where
. In particular, we suppose the existence of a representative consumer with the utility function ( ) ( ) We assume that firms compete in prices and find that firm k's profit-maximizing prices and quantities in equilibrium are given by ( )
If we focus on the case under consideration, i.e. on the case of { } 1 2 3 n , , ∈ , we finally obtain products are sufficiently close substitutes. Our model is therefore particularly relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, because consumers tend to perceive generics as being close (but imperfect) substitutes to the originator's product.
The Effects of a later Entry of the Second Generic
The entry decision of the second generic entrant is denoted by λ . We can also directly link this to the actual entry of the second generic since a later entry decision will lead to a later entry. Therefore the parameter λ reflects competitive pressure from the second generic on the already present firms. Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is based on two arguments: At first, the settlement surplus 1 s that firms can gain from a settlement compared to litigation is decreasing in λ , which might seem somewhat puzzling at first glance, because in general firms are able to reap a higher surplus from a settlement in case that market entry of potential entrants is delayed. Indeed, we find that an increase in λ ceteris paribus shifts the entry decision and hence the actual entry date ( ) γ , is decreasing in λ , because settlement surplus and triopoly profits decrease, making a patent challenge ceteris paribus less attractive.
Based on Lemma 1's results, we can study the overall impact of λ on opt t  . Our findings are given in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3: Under Example 1 the optimal policy parameter opt t  is strictly increasing in λ ,
i.e. we have that 0
To understand this result, we use Equation (7) 
Conclusions
In our paper we model the tradeoff between granting incentives for challenging weak patents and allowing collusion between originator and generic firms. We introduce a policy parameter to specify the time for which companies are allowed to share monopoly profits additional to the expected entry under litigation. We find that there exists an optimal specification for this policy parameter to maximize consumer welfare. Our key contribution is that consumer welfare under this optimal policy parameter is higher than under the benchmark litigation solution. This result holds under very general conditions. We examine the marginal effects of an increase in challenging costs, the later entry decision of the second generic challenger and the intensity of competition on our policy parameter and find that it should increase. perspective on the assessment of patent settlements which is to maintain optimal challenging incentives for weak patents.
We need to distinguish two cases:
First, depending on parameter constellations, the policy parameter can be negative. If challenging costs are particularly low in relation to the exogenous parameters, i.e. below g f , the policy parameter becomes negative which means that challenging incentives are too high and market entry too late. Under these conditions every patent settlement which is established by the parties decreases consumer welfare. Also, if the parties could (be forced to) engage into a specific agreement with earlier market entry than under litigation, consumer welfare could be increased. This approach would be clearly different from the Shapiro criterion since it would declare all settlements to violate antitrust rules where a better-or less restrictive alternative for consumers could be found (Shapiro 2003, pp. 396) . Such settlements are not realistic since agreements which are worse than the litigation option for the parties are not feasible. A state subsidy might incentivize parties to agree to an earlier market entry than under litigation, but this would also affect consumer welfare and change our model since the subsidy needs to be financed.
Secondly, there exist parameter constellations which allow a non-negative policy parameter.
This means that periods of collusion deviating from the expected entry under litigation with substantial reverse payments can be welfare increasing, especially under relatively high challenge costs, later entry decisions of the second generic or a market with relatively intense competition:
In case the policy parameter is non-negative we find that:
-Higher challenge costs reduce the range of patent strengths which are profitable to challenge. Thus to allow more collusion offsets this effect with the cost that for already challenged patents later market entries are created -consumer welfare increases overall.
-More time between the market entry of the first and second generic should allow for more collusion to increase welfare. Although the later entry decision of a second generic is a rather theoretical parameter which is hard to interpret and to assess in actual patent law cases, it is ceteris paribus directly linked in the model to the actual later entry of the second generic which, as a result, could be interpreted as competitive pressure by the second generic. To allow more collusion in situations where the entry decision of the 23 second generic occurs later is welfare increasing. If the second generic enters later, it can reap lesser triopoly profits and challenge incentives decrease. To maintain challenging incentives it is more valuable for the second generic to get a share of collusive profits instead of entering earlier. The benefit of additionally challenged patents by the second generic offsets the costs of later entry for already challenged patents by both generics.
-More intense competition between firms in the market triggers reduced incentives to challenge patents and thus should allow for more collusion to increase welfare. This on first glance counterintuitive result is explained by our model since benefits of additionally challenged patents in the future outweigh the loss occurring from later entry for already challenged patents.
It should be noted that the policy parameter theoretically could be such as to allow for collusion larger than the patent duration. In our model we do not include such a case.
However since it is not clear whether the actual patent duration granted by patent offices is an optimal one, the question of different periods of granted collusion can be raised. It might be that there exist parameter constellations that challenging incentives are optimal in case firms collude even after patent expiry. Patents inherently aim at solving the problem of optimal innovation incentives in the tradeoff with resulting price effects from monopoly. We do not include in our analysis the perspective of innovation effects. Thus we do not model that we might eventually extent the actual patent duration (to incentivize more patent challenges) since the question of the optimal duration of patents relies on innovation effects as well. We see in our model the patent duration as a given limitation of collusion.
Challenge costs or the competitiveness of the market environment are parameters which likely play a significant role in actual patent settlement cases. If it is observed that, under a nonnegative policy parameter, e.g. it is relatively costly to challenge the patent and enter the market or competition is intense, competition authorities might consider allowing more collusion to increase welfare. This can be an important insight for looking at individual patent settlement cases. If it is the competition authorities' or court`s rational to only prevent collusion in the individual case, they might prohibit a certain settlement in case they detect later market entry than expected under litigation. However, if they take into account that to encourage future patent challenges it might actually be justified to grant more collusion in deviation of the expected market entry under litigation, they could induce a welfare enhancing result.
With our model we firstly add an explicit argument for allowing reverse payments in patent settlements next to the already established arguments that e.g. high litigation costs, risk aversion or asymmetric information could be a justification for these payments (e.g. Very important is, that we do not model the overall optimal way to incentivize the challenging of patents. For instance we could think about finding the optimal level of patent challenges by including price effects but also innovation effects (Frank/Kerber 2015) . If more patents are challenged this might deteriorate innovation incentives of the originator which could yield entirely different results for our policy parameter, i.e. the policy parameter could become smaller or even negative than without taking into account innovation effects. This is because deteriorating innovation incentives for originators is a supplementary negative effect for consumer welfare besides the mentioned entry delay effect. Also taking into account patent value, as a different dimension besides patent strength, could entirely change our results, since the challenging of patents even with high challenging costs could become feasible in case high value patents are concerned. This would also raise questions which patents exactly should be challenged in terms of patent strength and patent value to maximize consumer welfare (e.g. should low value patents be challenged at all?). We assume an equal value of patents in our model.
Another important problem is whether our results for an optimal policy parameter should be regarded only on an individual case basis or can be seen as relevant for case groups, i.e. a population of patents with different patent strengths. E.g. it could be thought of using average values for our exogenous parameters based on a case group to calculate the optimal policy parameter. Although practically there occur difficult problems in terms of the specification of these parameters (e.g. average parameter values could be difficult in terms of market delineation), the idea that the policy parameter should incentivize future challenges to unspecified patent populations rather points at a relevance of our results for the average-or 25 case group perspective. Also we note that our results entail difficult competition policy issues regarding the balancing of benefits (or losses) for different groups of consumers (e.g. presentand future consumers). Difficult tradeoffs of this kind are something competition policy and also the law have tried to address before e.g. in including innovation effects in competition law.
In our paper we put forward a different perspective on the assessment of patent settlements and show that optimal incentives to challenge weak patents can be beneficial for consumers.
Since the actual legislation and debate in this field, currently seems to have a different focus by e.g. being very skeptical towards large reverse payments, we believe that this result adds an important insight for policy and the law in this field. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
Using Example 1's expressions for firms' profits in Equations (4) and (5) we know that ( ) 
